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First Reference by the UPC Court of Appeal to the CJEU – Dyson v Dreame

By order dated March 6, 2026, the Court of Appeal of the Unified Patent Court (UPC) referred questions for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for the first time in Dyson v Dreame. The referral concerns key issues regarding the UPC’s international jurisdiction (“long-arm jurisdiction”) as well as the classification of an EU representative as a potential “intermediary” within the meaning of the Enforcement Directive.

Background: Preliminary injunction by the Hamburg Local Division (Link)

The appeal proceedings originate from a preliminary injunction issued by the Hamburg Local Division on 14 August 2025 in the dispute between the patent proprietor Dyson Technology Ltd. and several companies of the Dreame Group. The case concerns EP 3 119 235, which protects curling-barrel technology used in handheld hair styling devices. Dyson alleged that various hair styling devices distributed by Dreame infringe this patented technology.

The defendants included Dreame International (Hong Kong) Ltd., the manufacturer and operator of several European product websites, the German distribution partner Teqphone GmbH, the Swedish subsidiary Dreame Technology AB, and the Germany-based Eurep GmbH, which acts as Dreame’s authorized EU representative under EU product safety regulations.

The Local Division largely granted Dyson’s application by way of a preliminary injunction. It prohibited the manufacture, offering, placing on the market, importation and storage of the contested products, as well as the provision of services by Eurep within the UPC territory. The injunction was also partially extended to the Spanish part of the European patent.

In doing so, the Local Division affirmed the UPC’s broad international jurisdiction, including over defendants based outside the EU. It relied on Article 71b(2) in conjunction with Articles 7(2) and 8(1) of the Brussels I recast regulation, taking the view that the alleged infringing acts produce effects within the UPC territory. The decision thus follows the case law of the CJEU in BSH Hausgeräte GmbH v Electrolux AB, in which the Court clarified that courts of a Member State may, under certain conditions, also rule on infringements of national parts of a European patent outside their own territory. This issue has been discussed in more detail in a previous article on the CJEU’s judgment in BSH Hausgeräte GmbH v Electrolux, see here

Furthermore, the Local Division classified Eurep GmbH, based in Germany, as an “authorized representative” under EU product safety and market surveillance regulations (Regulations (EU) 2023/988 and 2019/1020) and considered it an indispensable link in the distribution chain. As a result, it could be treated both as the relevant defendant for jurisdictional purposes and as an intermediary against whom injunctive relief may be granted pursuant to Article 63(1), second sentence, UPCA.

The first-instance decision thus illustrates how the UPC, through anchor defendants and intermediaries, may enable cross-border enforcement of injunctive relief even in complex international distribution structures.

The Court of Appeal: Extension of the injunction and referral to the CJEU

The Court of Appeal upheld the substance of the Hamburg decision but went significantly further in terms of scope. With respect to the UPC territory, it dismissed Dreame’s appeal and extended the preliminary injunction to additional products in Dyson’s favor.

At the same time, the Court of Appeal separated the proceedings. The parts of the appeal relating to injunctive relief effective in Spain and the claims against Eurep were stayed pursuant to Article 38(2) UPCA and Rule 266.5 of the Rules of Procedure, pending a decision by the CJEU. On all other issues, the Court of Appeal ruled by separate order issued on the same day (see  here: Link).

Four Questions Referred for a Preliminary Ruling

The Court of Appeal referred four questions to the CJEU regarding the interpretation of EU law.

The first question concerns Article 8(1) in conjunction with Article 71b(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. The CJEU is asked to clarify whether a situation involving a manufacturer based outside the EU and an intermediary based in a UPC member state is capable of giving rise to a risk of “irreconcilable judgments” and thereby justifying jurisdiction under Article 8(1). (Original text: Must Article 8(1) in conjunction with Article 71b(2) of Regulation 1215/2012 be interpreted as meaning that a situation where, in proceedings before a common court within the meaning of Article 71a(2) of Regulation 1215/2012, a first company that is established in a third State is alleged to have committed an infringement of a national part of a European patent which is in force in an EU Member State that is not party to the instrument establishing the common court, and a second company that is established in an EU Member State that is party to the instrument establishing the common court is alleged to be an intermediary whose services are used by the first company to infringe in the EU Member State that is not party to the instrument establishing the common court, is capable of leading to “irreconcilable judgments” resulting from separate proceedings as referred to in Article 8(1) Regulation 1215/2012?).

If Article 8(1) does not apply, the Court further asks whether jurisdiction for provisional measures against a third-country manufacturer may arise directly from Article 71b(2), second sentence, of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. This question is particularly relevant in cases where identical products are offered via nearly identical websites in both UPC Member states and non-UPC Member states.

(Original text: Must Article 71b(2), second sentence, of Regulation 1215/2012 be interpreted as meaning that a common court has jurisdiction in relation to an action for provisional measures against a company established in a third State that is alleged to have infringed a European patent in force in an EU Member State that is not party to the instrument establishing the common court, and in some or all EU Member States that are party to the instrument establishing the common court by offering the same products in all those EU Member States through websites that are identical apart from the language?).

The third question asks whether it is relevant for the determination of jurisdiction that the third-country manufacturer uses the services of a representative established in the EU?

(Original text: Is the fact that the company uses the services of a company that is established in an EU Member State that is party to the instrument establishing the common court in order to infringe a relevant circumstance in answering this second question?).

Fourth Question: “Authorized Representative” as an Intermediary?

The fourth question concerns the intersection between EU product safety law and harmonised EU intellectual property enforcement. The CJEU is asked to clarify whether Article 9(1)(a) of the Enforcement Directive 2004/48/EC, or any other provision of EU law, precludes a line of case law under which a patent injunction may be issued against an “authorized representative” acting  on behalf of a manufacturer established outside the EU, where that representative performs the tasks required under Regulations (EU) 2023/988 and 2019/1020. (Original text: Does Article 9(1)(a) of Directive 2004/48 or any other provision of Union law preclude case-law of a national or common court under which an interlocutory injunction aimed at preventing or prohibiting infringement of a patent by a third party by placing products on the market to which 10 Regulation 2023/988 and 2019/1020 apply may be granted against an authorised representative that performs the tasks laid down in these Regulations on behalf of the third party?).

The Hamburg Local Division had already taken a clear position on this issue. In light of the EU-law obligation to designate an economic operator established within the EU for certain product categories, it considered the authorised representative an integral part of the distribution system and therefore a potential intermediary.

The Court of Appeal builds on this reasoning but notes that the CJEU’s existing case law on the concept of an intermediary—for example, in UPC Telekabel Wien v Constantin Film (C- 314/12) or Tommy Hilfiger v Delta Center (C-494/15) —primarily concerns service providers whose services are used to facilitate infringements, such as marketplace operators or access providers. Whether this approach also extends to actors whose primary function is regulatory compliance, without direct control over the distribution, is the subject of the referral.

Outlook: Stay of Proceedings and CJEU ruling

With this referral, the clarification of key legal questions is now transferred to the level of EU law. The Court of Appeal has largely upheld the preliminary injunction for the UPC territory and partially extended it, but has stayed the proceedings concerning the territorial scope of the injunction and the claims directed against the EU authorized representative pending the CJEU’s decision.

The CJEU will thus have its first opportunity to address both the UPC’s international jurisdiction over third-country manufacturers and the possible classification of an EU authorized representative designated under product safety law as an intermediary under the Enforcement Directive. In doing so, the referral engages directly with the Court’s existing broad case law on the concept of an intermediary. Significantly, the Court of Appeal frames the question not in terms of whether such a classification is permissible under EU law, but rather whether Article 9(1)(a) of the Enforcement Directive would “preclude” it.

Until the CJEU delivers its judgment, these questions remain open and are likely to shape future UPC practice on cross-border injunctions. Once the CJEU has ruled, the case will return to the Court of Appeal, which will reassess the preliminary injunction in light of the Court’s guidance. Given that preliminary rulings typically take one to two years, a significant delay in the proceedings is to be expected.

Nicole Schopp